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[1483] 
Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D 
Printing: Decentralized Piracy  
Ben Depoorter* 
By drastically reducing the role of intermediaries in manufacturing, 3D printing is 
likely to set about the next wave of decentralized, non-commercial infringements of 
intellectual property rights. Drawing upon the lessons from the entertainment 
industry’s litigation campaign against illegal file sharing, this paper describes some of 
the common characteristics of decentralized piracy. I show that, like copyright 
enforcement on file-sharing networks, intellectual property enforcement of 3D 
printing faces economic and social norm complications that make traditional, 
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Introduction 
If you learn from a loss you have not lost. 
—Austin O’Malley, Keystones of Thought 191 (1914).  
3D printing technologies promise to revolutionize manufacturing.1 
By uploading digital blueprints to computers, users of 3D printers can 
create seamless physical objects in an additive process.2 As 3D 
technologies become more widespread, the general public will be able to 
use cheap, affordable home 3D printers to design and manufacture most 
products available on retail markets.3 A growing group of consumers are 
already putting 3D printers to use at home to manufacture household 
items, small sculptures, and spare parts.4 
It is already clear that 3D printing will radically change the role of 
intermediaries in manufacturing.5 The declining costs of fabricating 
physical items will reduce the necessity for specialization in 
 
 1. See Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the 
Digitization of Things, 102 Geo L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 10), available at 
http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2013/10/Desai-and-Magliocca-3D-Printing-Draft.pdf (“3D printing 
will unleash the power of digitized things on manufacturers.”). 
 2. See Anna Kaziunas France, Skill Builder: 3D Scanning, Make, Winter 2013, at 92; Sean 
Buckley, MakerBot’s Digitizer Will Go on Sale Next Week, Promises 3D Scanning to the Masses, 
Engadget (Aug. 14, 2013, 8:05 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2013/08/14/makerbots-digitizer-will-go-
on-sale-next-week. 
 3. Chris Anderson, Makers: The New Industrial Revolution 90–92 (2012); Charles W. 
Finocchiaro, Note, Personal Factory or Catalyst for Piracy? The Hype, Hysteria, and Hard Realities of 
Consumer 3-D Printing, 31 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 473, 473 (2013); Daniel Harris Brean, Asserting 
Patents to Combat Infringement via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use”, 23 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & 
Ent. L.J. 771, 771 (2013).  
 4. Neil Gershenfeld, How to Make Almost Anything: The Digital Fabrication Revolution, 
91 Foreign Aff. 43, 43–45 (2012). 
 5. See 3D Printing: The Printed World, Economist, Feb. 12, 2011, at 77; A Factory on Your 
Desk, Economist, Sept. 5, 2009, at 26. 
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manufacturing and the attainment of economies of scale.6 As a result, 
manufacturing is no longer synonymous with assembly lines and 
processing plants. Consumers can copy, adapt,7 and design items on their 
computers and print them out at home, or email blueprint design files to 
companies that operate more advanced 3D printers.8 
By reducing the costs of designing, manufacturing, and distributing 
goods, 3D printing is predicted to set about an “industrial counter-
revolution.”9 Although personal 3D printers might not be well-suited for 
mass scale production, they promise to make households largely self-
sufficient.10 As such, 3D printing shifts some core sectors of retailing 
away from traditional large manufacturers to the various intermediaries 
that facilitate 3D printing, including (but not limited to) individual 
designers of blueprints and industries that create and distribute 3D 
printing technologies and peripherals. 
Revolutionary, disruptive technologies bring about novel legal 
challenges.11 Likewise, 3D printing is likely to raise a host of legal 
issues.12 Especially intellectual property (“IP”) holders are likely to be 
affected because 3D printing makes the infringement of IP rights cheaper 
and more attractive.13 While users of 3D printers may end up designing 
original products or acquiring licensed blueprints from designers, users 
 
 6. Simon Bradshaw et al., The Intellectual Property Implications of Low-Cost 3D Printing, 7 
Scripted 5, 11 (2010). 
 7. On the customization possibilities of 3D printing, see Neil Gershenfeld, Fab: The Coming 
Revolution on Your Desktop—From Personal Computers to Personal Fabrication Loc. 500 
(Kindle Edition, 2005). 
 8. E.g., Steven Kurutz, Bringing 3-D Power to the People, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 2014, at D1. 
 9. See, e.g., 3D Printing: The Printed World, supra note 5; Marshall Burns & James Howison, 
Digital Manufacturing—Napster Fabbing: Internet Delivery of Physical Products, 7 Rapid 
Prototyping J. 194, 196 (2001). 
10. See generally Aaron Council & Michael Petch, 3D Printing: Rise of the Third Industrial 
Revolution Electronic Book, 2014). 
 11. On the impact of technological advances on the development of tort law, see, for example, 
James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 Mich. L. 
Rev. 405, 417–26 (1985) (discussing political obstabcles to the efficient regulation of new technlogies); 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 52–57 (1972) (discussing railroad 
crossings); see also Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, 
and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 293 (1988) (demonstrating the different 
effects of durable and non-durable prevention technologies on tortious accidents). 
 12. These issues include potential claims involving products liability and gun-regulation. See 
generally Peter Jensen-Haxel, Note, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and the Right to 
Build Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 447 (2012) (describing how 
3D printing renders current firearm regulations obsolete); Nora Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing and 
Product Liability: Identifying the Obstacles, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 35 (2013) (discussing 
challenges to product liability in 3D printing markets); Mark Gibbs, The End of Gun Control?, 
Forbes.com (July 28, 2012, 4:24 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/markgibbs/2012/07/28/the-end-of-gun-
control; Chris Brandrick, 3D Printer Lets You Print Your Own Prescription, PC World (Apr. 19, 
2012, 3:59 PM), 
http://www.techhive.com/article/254118/3d_printer_lets_you_print_your_own_prescription.html. 
 13. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 6, at 12. 
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are also likely to print items protected by IP rights without proper 
authorization. For example, users might download unauthorized 
blueprints online and print unauthorized reproductions of retail products 
that violate the exclusive rights of patent, trade dress, or copyright 
holders. Such IP infringement requires only the purchase of raw input 
print materials14 and the blueprints, which are often freely available 
online.15 
Although manufacturing and retail industries have always faced 
commercial counterfeit markets, the digital revolution of 3D printing 
presents an unfamiliar challenge to these industries: highly decentralized 
piracy where consumers obtain counterfeit goods cheaply, without 
assistance from commercial counterfeiters. In this regard, 3D printing 
presents some of the same challenges as the digitization of music, books, 
and movies before it. 
This shift from traditional commercial counterfeit markets to 
decentralized, non-commercial piracy sets the stage for a potential 
explosion of IP infringements. IP enforcement against decentralized 
infringements is an uphill battle, as the entertainment industry 
experienced in the wake of the widespread use of file-sharing 
technologies. Commentators already predict that IP enforcement on 3D 
printing is a lost cause based on the limited success of copyright 
enforcement against file sharing.16 
What makes IP enforcement so difficult when infringement is 
decentralized? Is IP enforcement a lost cause in the context of 3D 
printing? This Article discusses common characteristics of decentralized 
infringement and the unique challenges they present for the enforcement 
of IP rights. I argue that decentralized piracy creates unique practical, as 
well as normative obstacles that render traditional means of IP 
enforcement troublesome. The social costs of enforcing IP rights in these 
settings are likely to be high, making alternative regulatory approaches 
more appealing. 
Part I of this Article examines the IP rights affected by 3D printing. 
Part II considers the legal uncertainty involved with 3D printing. Part III 
describes common characteristics of decentralized piracy and discusses 
the main enforcement challenges. This Article concludes with a few 
reflections to address the challenges of 3D printing. 
 
 14. Printing Material Suppliers, RepRap.org, http://reprap.org/wiki/Printing_Material_Suppliers 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2014). 
 15. Legitimate blueprint download sites might emerge as well. See Gershenfeld, supra note 7, at 
Loc. 590–92. 
 16. Infra Part III. 
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I.  3D Printing’s Potential for Intellectual Property 
Infringements 
Producers and distributors of physical objects have generally been 
shielded from the problem of widespread, direct infringement online.17 
As opposed to literature, music, film, and other types of copyrighted 
content, most physical objects cannot be rendered into a digital format 
without taking away their utilitarian features. For instance, the 
unauthorized pictorial rendition of a designer clock online presents 
potential copyright issues relating to copyright in the photo itself. Such 
copyright infringement, however, leaves unaffected (and may even 
promote) the demand for the actual clock as a useful and/or aesthetic 
physical object. 
Enter 3D printing. A 3D scanner can create a computer-aided 
design (“CAD”) map of the clock.18 This CAD blueprint can be 
distributed on the Internet, and anyone with a 3D printer can print an 
exact replica of the clock.19 The creation and distribution of 
unauthorized reproductions of the clock by way of 3D technology 
potentially infringes on the exclusive rights of holders of utility patents, 
design patents, and trademarks.20 
First and foremost, 3D printing may involve the infringement of 
multiple patent rights. When a user of a 3D printer renders the physical 
object that is the subject of a patent, the CAD blueprint might infringe 
the applicable patent rights on that article. Using a 3D printer to then 
reproduce a patented product infringes on the patent right. Moreover, 
any use of the printed object may violate the rights on the patent.21 
Second, trademark holders will also be affected by 3D printing. Any 
sale of a 3D printed object that includes a trademark might infringe on 
the rights of the trademark owner. In most instances, the user of the 3D 
printer can avoid trademark infringement by reproducing the product 
without the logo or trademark. But even on products that do not have a 
logo, trademark right violations might take place whenever a user seeks 
to print products that are protected by trade dress. Even if the 3D printer 
does not seek to include a trademark or the seller does not actively pass 
off the item as being manufactured by the owner of the right, it might be 
an infringement to sell any printed products in a shape that resembles 
 
 17. Of course, illegal markets for counterfeit goods became more accessible online. Yet, as 
opposed to digital goods, physical counterfeit goods are relatively expensive to produce and 
infringement is less anonymous and more risky, since such illicit markets require physical locations 
and addresses to ship from. 
 18. See France, supra note 2. 
 19.  Peter Schmitt, Works By Peter Schmitt 2000–2014 9 (2014), 
http://web.media.mit.edu/~peter/about/Portfolio-Peter-Schmitt.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). 
 20. For an overview, see Desai & Magliocca, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2). 
 21. Id. 
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established trade dress. Such unauthorized third-party uses of 
trademarks constitute an infringement, and sales of those products might 
run afoul of the post-sale confusion doctrine even if purchasers are not 
confused.22 
Finally, 3D printing technology also presents challenges to 
industries protected by copyright law. Whenever 3D printers are used to 
make counterfeit items, this might infringe the copyright on creative 
designs that appear on such items. That is, if the decorative features of a 
product can be separated, either physically or conceptually, from the 
useful aspects of the article,23 then the holder of the copyright in the 
aesthetic design has a potential claim against any unauthorized 
reproduction.24 Take the example of an individual who reproduces a coat 
hanger. The individual might have downloaded the blueprint of the 
particular coat hanger because it is the right size for her wall. If, however, 
the coat hanger has decorative elements (such as a colorful drawing, 
etched designs, etc.) that can be identified separately from the useful 
aspects of the coat hanger, the original manufacturer might be able to 
bring a claim for copyright infringement for the reproduction of the 
decorative design. In the context of 3D printing, a copyright claimant can 
pursue a claim of direct infringement against any individual who 
reproduced the creative design on a physical object (owners of 3D 
printers). Claimants may also pursue claims for indirect infringement on 
the basis of contributory or vicarious copyright liability against 
manufactures, writers of CAD designs, and other intermediaries that 
facilitated the infringing activity.  
 
 22. The trademark law post-sale confusion doctrine holds that infringing trade dress can infringe 
upon the rights of the owner of a mark even if purchasers of the infringing product are not confused. 
See Connie Davis Powell, We All Know It’s A Knock-Off! Re-Evaluating the Need for the Post-Sale 
Confusion Doctrine in Trademark Law, 14 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 1, 35 (2012). 
 23. The 1976 Copyright Act defines pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2011) (“‘Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ include two-dimensional and three-dimensional 
works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, 
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include 
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”). When a work’s useful and aesthetic features 
are so intertwined that they cannot be separated physically, courts must consider whether there is 
conceptual separability between the form and function of a work. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy 
Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).  
 24. For a discussion of copyright issues involving 3D printing, see, for example, Brian Rideout, 
Printing the Impossible Triangle: The Copyright Implications of Three-Dimensional Printing, 5 J. Bus. 
Entrepreneurship & L. 161, 163–64 (2012); Haritha Dasari, Assessing Copyright Protection and 
Infringement Issues Involved With 3D Printing and Scanning, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 279 (2013); Edward Lee, 
Digital Originality, 14 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 919 (2012). 
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3D printers also might be used to produce unauthorized derivate 
works. These secondary derivate work markets, such as t-shirts, toys, and 
game boards, are a means for copyright holders to recoup some of their 
initial investment in an underlying music album, movie, or TV show.25 
One might be tempted to suggest that derivate work markets can even 
explain some creative decisions.26 3D printers enable fans to scan, 
reproduce, and modify these derivate physical products without 
authorization. For instance, a fan of the HBO series Game of Thrones, 
one of the most illegally downloaded TV shows of all time,27 
independently developed and printed a Game of Thrones iPhone 
docking station.28 Such unauthorized reproductions are appealing in the 
context of 3D printing because the technology enables fans to create or 
otherwise obtain customized, altered versions of derivate works. As 
Deven R. Desai and Gerard N. Magliocca illustrate: 
Today, if you buy a doll, a Lego set, or a car, the ability to alter, tinker, 
or improve your purchase is low. 3D printing, however, opens the door 
to personal improvement. You still buy the doll or dollhouse; but once 
a child is bored, 3D printing allows you to design and create new heads, 
limbs, or furniture. Instead of relying on Lego to decide what a piece 
looks like or does, the consumer can make new ones.29 
In this process, 3D printing potentially disrupts the secondary markets 
that help sustain copyright holders in today’s world of illegal music and 
movie file sharing, where illegal digital downloading has already eroded 
revenues from record and DVD sales.30 
II.  3D Printing and Intellectual Property Uncertainty 
Innovation is often rapid and unpredictable. Legal systems take 
time to adapt to new technological advancements. Lawmaking is a 
complex process that involves planning, procedures, and the 
 
 25. Take the example of Game of Thrones. Reporting on a recent infringement issue, HBO Vice 
President of Corporate Affairs Jeff Cusson commented that “with a show like Game of Thrones, the 
amount of product licensed around . . . is exorbitant.” Nathan Hurst, HBO Blocks 3-D Printed Game 
of Thrones iPhone Dock, Wired (Feb. 13, 2013, 1:57 PM), http://www.wired.com/design/2013/02/got-
hbo-cease-and-desist. 
 26. For example, a new generation of toy buyers could help explain the Star Wars and Lego 
movies, etc. 
 27. Ernesto, ‘Game of Thrones’ Most Pirated TV-Show of 2013, TorrentFreak (Dec. 25, 2013), 
http://torrentfreak.com/game-of-thrones-most-pirated-tv-show-of-2013-131225 (“Game of Thrones has 
the honor of becoming the most downloaded TV-show for the second year in a row.”); Kory Grow, 
‘Game of Thrones,’ ‘Breaking Bad’ Among the Most Pirated Shows of 2013, Rolling Stone (Dec. 26, 
2013, 2:50 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/news/game-of-thrones-breaking-bad-among-the-
most-pirated-shows-of-2013-20131226. 
 28. See Hurst, supra note 25. 
 29. See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 1 (manuscript at 12). 
 30.  See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz, Testing File-Sharing's Impact by Examining Record Sales in 
Cities, 54 Mgmt. Sci., 852 (2008) (presenting empirical evidence that file sharing is responsible for 
historical decline in record sales). 
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participation of various stakeholders. The dynamic and unpredictable 
nature of technological innovation makes it difficult for lawmakers to 
predict or anticipate forthcoming inventions. As a result, courts and 
legislators have a difficult time responding proactively to avoid delays 
between the time people begin to use a technology and its legal 
classification (including the allocation of liability). Additionally, many 
areas of law apply open-ended standards. While standards reduce the 
cost of errors and enable copyright decisionmakers to be more flexible, 
these open-ended standards increase the number of difficult questions 
that courts must confront.31 
The initial ambiguity as to the potential social and economic 
implications of a novel technology also contributes to the gap between 
the use of a technology and its legal classification by courts and 
legislators. It must first become apparent that the use of novel 
technology entails substantial opportunity costs to producers—that is, 
that there are “gains to be internalized.”32 Not until the opportunity costs 
of unregulated use of 3D printers become fully clear will manufacturers 
push to obtain protection through litigation and legislation. Until then, 
manufactures and users of 3D printers will continue to operate in a 
vacuum of considerable legal uncertainty.33 Consider, for example, the 
difficulty of perfectly predicting ex ante how courts will apply the law to 
new circumstances ex post.34 
 
 31. On the distinction between rules and standards, see, for example, Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Rules 
Versus Standards in Rich and Poor Countries: Precise Legal Norms as Substitutes for Human Capital 
in Low-Income Countries, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 113, 113 (2006) (“Legal norms can be precise rules, 
which are blueprints for action and allow for mechanical decisions by judges and civil servants. 
Alternatively, they can be vague, mission-oriented standards, which delegate decisions from the maker 
of the law to the judiciary and the administration. Rules economize on the costs of adjudication and 
administration. Standards economize on the costs of norm specification.”); Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985). 
 32. On the evolution of IP rights, see Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The 
Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property Law, 9 Va. J.L. & Tech. 1, 34–41 (2004) [hereinafter, 
Depoorter, Several Lives]; Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on 
Copyright Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1830, 1841–42 (2009) [hereinafter, Depoorter, Technology and 
Uncertainty] (“The initial ambiguity of the socioeconomic implications of a new technology can be 
illustrated, for example, by peer-to-peer music exchanges. The music industry discovered that huge 
profits could be made by delivering music in a compressed format (MP3) only after such exchanges 
were already relatively common.”). See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 
46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 63, 99 (2002) (“Even with the introduction and rapid popularity of digitally-
encoded compact disks (CDs) and the proliferation of microcomputers beginning in the early 1980s, 
the record industry did not appreciate the dramatic changes that would be brought about by the 
emerging digital technologies.”). 
 33. One current definition of legal uncertainty is that it describes a situation where an act is “said 
by informed attorneys to have an expected official outcome at or near the 0.5 level of predictability.” 
Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1983). 
 34. Note that there is a distinction between risk and uncertainty. Individuals are subject to risk if 
(1) an event may or may not happen in the future, and (2) the chance that the event will happen is 
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Although uncertainty pervades all areas of the law,35 technological 
breakthroughs, by their nature, make it more difficult to apply judicial 
precedent by analogy.36 This is certainly the case for 3D printing. As 
commentators have noted, 3D printers, like file sharing before them, 
present a series of novel legal questions that require courts to stretch 
existing doctrines to a radically new technology. IP rights holders will 
face hurdles in cabining new uses of 3D printers into existing IP 
doctrines.37 For patent right holders, 3D printing presents novel legal 
issues pertaining to infringement. When pursuing claims against 
individual users of 3D printers, a patent right holder will need to make 
the case that the creation and distribution of CAD files is the legal 
equivalent of a use or sale of the underlying patented invention.38 When 
suing manufacturers of the printers or providers of the CAD/Computer 
Aided Manufacturing (“CAM”) files based on of patent law’s indirect 
infringement doctrine, patent holders will need to meet the difficult 
burden of proving that the alleged infringer possessed actual knowledge 
of a specific, infringed patent.39 As a result, although “consumer use of 
3D printers may create multiple instances of patent infringement, 
policing and protecting patent rights in inventions copied on 3D printers 
may present significant challenges for patent holders.”40  
Similarly, trademark owners face a number of obstacles that hinder 
effective enforcement of their rights. First, trademark owners will find it 
difficult to enforce their rights as against 3D printouts of trademarked 
goods when the actual logo or trademark is removed from the printed 
product, while owners of product configurations will always need to 
 
known. By contrast, an event is uncertain if (1) it may or may not happen in the future, and (2) we do 
not know the chances that it will happen. See generally Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and 
Profit (Harper & Row 1965) (1921). 
 35. On legal uncertainty generally, see D’Amato, supra note 33 (describing a trend toward 
greater uncertainty); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 
3 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1974) (examining the optimal level of precision for rules and standards); Werner 
Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law’s Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1233 (1974) (discussing 
considerations involved in, and obstacles to, reducing uncertainty); Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, 
Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 341 (1991) 
(examining how rules and balancing approaches evolve out of litigation). 
 36. Even what looks straightforward now in hindsight is often anything but obvious at the time a 
new technology emerges. File sharing, for instance, challenged our understanding of piracy: many 
direct infringements lack a commercial purpose, and there are no conventional intermediaries. 
 37. Infra Part III. 
 38. For an in-depth discussion of the doctrinal issues involving 3D printing, see Brean, supra note 3. 
 39. See Finocchiaro, supra note 3 (noting that the substantial non-infringing uses of 3D printing 
bring the technology closer to the Sony precedent than Grokster). 
 40. Bryan J. Vogel, IP: 3D Printing and Potential Patent Infringement, Inside Counsel (Oct. 29, 2013), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/10/29/ip-3d-printing-and-potential-patent-infringement.html. 
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demonstrate that their trade dress has acquired secondary meaning.41 
Moreover, trademark plaintiffs will need to demonstrate that the alleged 
infringer has “used the mark in commerce,” as opposed to having 
engaged in a merely personal use.42 On the copyright front, most 
instances of copyright infringement involving 3D printing will force 
courts to concentrate on an area of law that is mired in doctrinal 
confusion and uncertainty: the conceptual separation of useful and 
creative aspects of a product.43 In order to determine whether separate 
copyrightable features are present, courts apply opposing artistic theories 
of interpretation, often mixing various incompatible theories together 
within one decision.44 
It is difficult to predict ex ante how courts or legislators will 
categorize some of the potential uses of 3D printers. The resulting 
ambiguity provides ample opportunity for owners of 3D printers to 
engage in self-serving interpretations and to convince themselves that no 
infringement has been committed.45 As research in the field of cognitive 
psychology demonstrates, individuals are inclined to construct facts in 
ways that align with their own preconceived beliefs.46 Just as was the case 
 
 41. While simple trade dress can be “inherently” distinctive, valid product-design trade dress 
must acquire a distinct association with a specific manufacturer in the public’s mind. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000). 
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 114 (2011). For a discussion of trademark issues relating to 3D printing, see 
Michael Weinberg, Public Knowledge, It Will Be Awesome If They Don’t Screw It Up: 3D 
Printing, Intellectual Property, and the Fight over the next Great Disruptive Technology 1, 3 
(2010); Desai & Magliocca, supra note 1 (manuscript at 34). 
 43. For a discussion of the doctrinal confusion among courts, see, for example, Ben Depoorter & 
Robert Kirk Walker, The Dangerous Undertaking: How Courts Should Approach Aesthetic 
Judgments in Copyright Law, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Depoorter & 
Walker, Dangerous Undertaking]; Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 247 (1998); Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 805 (2005). 
 44. For instance, the Second Circuit held that the useful aspects of decorative belt buckles could 
be sufficiently separated from their ornamental, aesthetic aspects; the Second Circuit applied all three 
major, but internally incompatible, theories of artistic interpretation. See Depoorter & Walker, 
Dangerous Undertaking, supra note 43 (“In finding that the buckles in question ‘rise to the level of 
creative art,’ the court referred to the intention of the author, but also noted that the buckles were well 
received in art and fashion circles. Institutional interpretations surfaced as well when the court 
rejected the notion that the utilitarian nature of fashion items excludes such articles from copyright 
protection: ‘body ornamentation has been an art form since the earliest days, as anyone who has seen 
the Tutankhamen or Scythian gold exhibits at the Metropolitan Museum will readily attest.’” (quoting 
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 990 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 45. See generally Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty, supra note 32 (exploring the enabling 
effect of legal uncertainty and delay on norm formation processes generally and in the context of peer-
to-peer file sharing). 
 46. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of 
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. of Econ. Perspectives 109, 113 (1997) (authors assigned participants in a 
study to either the plaintiff or defendant in a hypothetical automotive accident tort case with a 
maximum potential damages payment of $100,000. The plaintiff’s prediction of the likely judicial 
award was on average $14,527 higher than the defendant’s. The plaintiff’s average nomination of a 
“fair” figure was $17,709 higher than the defendant’s). See generally Donald Braman and Dan M. 
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with file sharing,47 by the time that courts and legislators have ruled on 
the legal effects of many uses of 3D printers, many users will no longer 
be neutral bystanders. Users of 3D printers will likely form beliefs and 
attitudes that support liberal uses of 3D printers and will reject legal 
reform to the contrary.48 Users of 3D printers might experience loss 
aversion when what they consider to be legitimate is suddenly found to 
be illegal. In this process, the perception of having something “taken 
away” might add to the resistance we can expect when IP rights will be 
enforced on products of 3D printing.49 
In the meantime, while courts begin to examine a fit between 
existing IP laws and 3D printing, the legal ambiguities will foster 3D 
printing activities without much consideration for IP laws. Moreover, the 
decentralized nature of infringement in a 3D setting adds another 
complication to the enforcement of IP rights. 
III.  Decentralized Piracy and Enforcement 
Broadband networks, digital music files, and peer-to-peer file-
sharing applications widely expanded access to unlicensed copies of 
copyrighted material. Organizations such as the Recording Industry 
Association of America (“RIAA”), the Motion Picture Association of 
America (“MPAA”), and the Entertainment Software Association 
(“ESA”) argue that file sharing is responsible for significant declines in 
the sale of music, DVDs, and videogames.50 Over the past decade the 
entertainment industry worked hard to combat online infringement of 
 
Kahan, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1291 (2003) (describing culturally biased interpretations of data). 
 47. See Depoorter, Several Lives, supra note 32 (describing cyclical process of technology, norm 
adaptation and judicial determination). 
 48. On the internalization of social norms, see Robert Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on 
Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 Or. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Robert Cooter, Do Good 
Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577 (2000). 
 49. Experimental research demonstrates that individuals value certain resources or legal 
entitlements that they possess more than they would value the exact same thing had they never 
possessed it at all. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect 
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. of Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990); George Lowenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, 
Source Dependence in the Valuation of Objects, 7 J. of Behav. Decision Making 157 (1994). 
 50. For empirical evidence, see, for example, Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative 
Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. & Econ. 1, 14–17 (2006) (presenting evidence that file 
sharing reduced recording industry revenues); Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C’s: 
Music Downloading, Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, 49 J.L. 
& Econ. 29, 30 (2006) (downloading reduced purchases by individuals in their sample by about ten 
percent during 2003). For an overview, see Stan J. Liebowitz, Economists Examine File Sharing and 
Music Sales, in Industrial Organization and the Digital Economy 145 (Gerhard Illing & Martin 
Peitz eds., 2006). But see Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on 
Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 3 (2007) (finding no negative impact of file 
sharing on CD sales). On video game piracy, see Ben Depoorter, What Happened to Video Game 
Piracy?, Comm. of the ACM (Ass’n for Computing Mach., New York, N.Y.), May 2014, at 33. 
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copyrighted content on file-sharing networks and BitTorrent sites. The 
music industry has waged a litigation campaign on various fronts, 
targeting individual end users of file-sharing technologies,51 as well as 
software developers and various other intermediaries, such as Internet 
service providers and website hosts.52 These enforcement efforts have 
failed to create a satisfactory reduction in file sharing for the industry. By 
most accounts, file sharing and massive online copyright infringement 
continue unabated.53 In 2012, the industry decided to abandon 
deterrence strategies in favor of more cooperative models,54 while 
continuing to pursue favorable legislation.55 
As a practical matter, 3D printing technologies enable 
decentralized, mainstream piracy. 3D printing fundamentally alters the 
production function of piracy because it enables consumers to obtain 
counterfeit goods cheaply, without assistance from commercial 
 
 51. For a discussion of the RIAA litigation campaign against individual file sharers, see Ben 
Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1251 (2011) [hereinafter Depoorter et al., 
Copyright Backlash]. For an overview of RIAA litigation actions, see, for example, Recording 
Industry Association of America Case Activity from Lexis/Nexis Courtlink, Lexis Nexis, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/trial/nalm100181clinkriaa.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2014); infra note 60. 
 52. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, 
Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Plaintiffs claim Napster users are engaged 
in the wholesale reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works, all constituting direct 
infringement.”); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003) (plaintiff claiming contributory and vicarious copyright infringement on behalf of producers 
of file-sharing application), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). For 
Internet service providers, see, for example, In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc. 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 
(D.D.C. 2003) (copyright holders seeking enforcement of subpoenas demanding the identities of 
copyright infringers), rev’d, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 53. Press Release: BitTorrent and µTorrent Software Surpass 150 Million User Milestone; 
Announce New Consumer Electronics Partnerships, BitTorrent (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.bittorrent.com/intl/es/company/about/ces_2012_150m_users (“BitTorrent Mainline and 
µTorrent software clients have grown to over 150 million monthly active users worldwide.”); Ernesto, 
BitTorrent Accounts for 35% of All Upload Traffic, VPNs are Booming, TorrentFreak (May 18, 2013), 
http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-accounts-for-35-of-all-upload-traffic-vpns-are-booming-130518 (“New 
data published by the Canadian broadband management company Sandvine reveals that BitTorrent 
can be credited for one third of all North American upload traffic during peak hours. BitTorrent usage 
also remains strong in Europe, Latin America and Asia Pacific. The report further confirms that SSL 
traffic has more than doubled in a year, partly due to an increase in VPN use.”).  
 54. On the U.S. Copyright Alert system, see, for example, Abigail Phillips, The Content Industry 
and ISPs Announce a “Common Framework for Copyright Alerts”: What Does it Mean for Users?, 
Electronic Frontier Found. (July 7, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/07/content-industry-
and-isps-announce-common; Chris Morran, COMCASTIC 3 Report: Comcast Sends Out Around 
1,800 Copyright Alert Notices Each Day, Consumerist (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http://consumerist.com/2014/02/07/report-comcast-sends-out-around-1800-copyright-alert-notices-
each-day. 
 55. Past attempts include, for example, the Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004, H.R. 
4077, 108th Cong. (2004) (bolstering copyright enforcement on the Internet); Author, Consumer, and 
Computer Owner Protection and Security Act of 2003, H.R. 2752, 108th Cong. (2003) (expanding 
domestic and international copyright enforcement); Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003, 
H.R. 2517, 108th Cong. (2003) (expanding the authority of the government to seize pirated works). 
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counterfeiters. In this regard, 3D printing shares common ground with 
the digitization of music, books, and movies before it. The technology 
facilitates massive direct, non-commercial infringement of IP rights by 
individual consumers. In other words, 3D printing brings the “Napster” 
revolution of decentralized infringement to the doorstep of 
manufacturers and retailers of physical articles.56 As a result, 
commentators predict that 3D printing infringement will devalue IP 
rights and that “even the best efforts to stop this surge in infringement 
will fall short.”57 The assumption is that 3D printing creates similar 
infringement dynamics that have made the enforcement of copyright law 
for file sharing so difficult. The next Subpart of this Article examines this 
assumption and analyzes the common characteristics of decentralized 
piracy. Drawing upon the lessons from the entertainment industry’s 
litigation campaign against file sharing, it is clear that IP litigation is not 
likely to provide an effective countermeasure to 3D printing copyright 
infringement. 
A. The Economics of Enforcing Decentralized Infringement 
3D printing drastically reduces the role of intermediaries in 
manufacturing. At the same time, it also reduces the potential role of 
intermediaries in the production of counterfeit goods and other piracy 
related activities. Individuals that possess personal 3D printers can print 
infringing materials inside their home with hardly any outside assistance. 
Whoever owns a 3D printer and a 3D scanner can simply scan and copy 
any existing product in their possession. Worse, 3D printer users can 
download blueprint CAD files of existing products online and print 
physical copies at home. Although printing larger items may require the 
involvement of intermediaries operating commercial 3D printers, 
consumers can manufacture regular-size counterfeit items. As with peer-
to-peer file sharing and music copyright before it, counterfeit piracy 
becomes a mainstream, non-commercial activity in a world of 3D 
printing. 
The novel, decentralized nature of 3D piracy has a profound effect 
on the enforcement of IP rights as they relate to 3D printing. To the 
extent that third parties, such as designers of blueprints or distributors of 
CAD files, are involved with facilitating 3D printing IP infringements, 
these third parties may not be held liable. As was clarified in the context 
 
 56. See Davis Doherty, Downloading Infringement: Patent Law as a Roadblock to the 3D 
Printing Revolution, 26 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 353, 355 (2012) (“3D printing also enables widespread 
patent infringement in the form of digital downloads in much the same manner that the advent of 
digital music enabled widespread copyright infringement.”); Brean, supra note 3. 
 57. Desai & Magliocca, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4). But see Finocchiaro, supra note 3 (arguing 
that physical and technological limitations make 3D printing less likely to threaten IP rights than peer-
to-peer and file-sharing technologies before it). 
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of decentralized file-sharing technologies, contributory or vicarious 
liability requires a certain level of control or involvement in enabling 
infringing uses of the technology that might not be present in this 
context.58 Moreover, even if creators and distributors of blueprint 
designs can be held liable, enforcement will be difficult as a practical 
matter. The creation and distribution of blueprint designs do not 
necessitate substantial investments. Rather, these activities may be 
driven by intrinsic and social motivations, reputation, and informal 
relationships. In such online, user-driven, and peer-production 
environments, the absence of a central, hierarchical residual claimant 
complicates case enforcement because it is more difficult to target 
offenders whose sole presence is online and whose purpose is not 
commercial. 
The reduced involvement of intermediaries drastically increases the 
economic costs of enforcement overall. If no intermediary can be held 
liable, monitoring and enforcement cannot be delegated onto these third-
party intermediaries. As a result, instead of pursuing claims against a few 
intermediaries, rights holders must file claims against individual 
infringers.59 
When facing decentralized enforcement, IP rights holders thus face 
a daunting challenge. First, since most infringement occurs inside private 
homes, there is a greater perception of safety and anonymity with 
unauthorized 3D printing than when purchasing illegal goods in markets 
or online using a credit card. Like music and movie downloading on 
peer-to-peer networks, most infringement will be difficult to detect. 
Second, since infringement is easy and relatively cheap, affordable 
3D printers are likely to generate a great number of infringements. Most 
users of 3D printers will realize that the probability of being caught is 
remote, given the vast amount of infringing uses that occur at any given 
moment. 
 
 58. For instance, in the context of indirect liability of providers, courts rejected the application of 
Napster to decentralized file-sharing services because liability for contributory infringement implies 
“actual knowledge of infringement at a time when [file-sharing services] can use that knowledge to 
stop the particular infringement.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 
259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, 3D print technologies are capable of substantial non-
infringing uses. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
(protecting time shifting of television recordings as substantially non-infringing use). 
 59. On the economics of gate-keeper liability in the context of copyright infringement, see 
Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic 
Perspective, 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 395, 396 (2003) (“The argument in favor of [indirect] liability is that 
third parties are often in a good position to discourage copyright infringement either by monitoring 
direct infringers or by redesigning their technologies to make infringement more difficult.”); William 
Landes & Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: Napster and Beyond, 
17 J. Econ. Persp. 113 (2003). See generally Reinier Kraakman, Third-Party Liability, in Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law 583 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
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Third, as the amount of infringement increases, the probability of 
getting caught reduces further for every potential infringer. Because the 
rights holders’ resources to pursue IP violations are limited, as the 
number of infringers increases, each individual infringer’s chance of 
being caught decreases. This, in turn, will likely lower inhibitions against 
producing counterfeit items on 3D printers even further. 
Unless IP rights holders can easily obtain the identities of infringers 
and file class-action lawsuits, something that has so far eluded copyright 
owners in the context of file sharing,60 IP rights holders will not have the 
resources to pursue most infringement. Efforts by rights holders to 
reduce the costs of enforcement will likely create new legal questions 
involving a wide array of issues relating to privacy, procedural issues such 
as class certifications, subpoena requests, and the involvement of 
Internet service providers.61 It will take time for these questions to work 
their way through the courts or Congress, as was the case with peer-to-
peer litigation concerning many other revolutionary technologies. 
Meanwhile, the legal uncertainty and delay sets up an environment 
conducive to infringing behavior. 
In order to have a deterrent effect and create a perception of 
effective enforcement, IP rights holders might resort to aggressive tactics: 
strike hard and set salient examples that highlight the dangers of 
infringing patent, trademark, or copyrights by way of unauthorized 3D 
printing. In doing so, however, overly aggressive enforcement might 
undermine public support for IP rights.62 
B. Decentralized Enforcement and Social Norm Complications 
By resorting to aggressive tactics, IP rights holders face the risk of 
undermining public support for the very rights that they are seeking to 
protect. The punitive litigation campaign of the RIAA, which included 
mass settlement demand letters and large statutory damage awards, 
illustrates the public relations downside to heavy-handed enforcement in 
a decentralized infringement environment. First, due to the large number 
of infringers, any instance of individual enforcement appears random. 
Targeting a limited number of infringers in an effort to set an example 
risks creating the perception that a few individuals are arbitrarily being 
singled out in a negative litigation lottery. This is one of the lessons from 
the peer-to-peer litigation campaign. When the music industry attempted 
 
 60. On the different stages of the copyright enforcement campaign and the various setbacks, see 
RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, Electronic Frontier Found. (Sept. 30, 2008), 
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Infra Part III-B. 
H - Depoorter_13 (E. Goldberg).doc (Do Not Delete) 8/17/2014 4:52 PM 
1498 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1483 
to set examples,63 the resulting statutory damage awards were widely 
condemned as arbitrary and excessive, setting in motion proposals to 
reform copyright law.64 
Alternatively, IP holders might ramp up the scale of enforcement. 
For instance, like copyright holders today, rights holders might try to 
stem the distribution of CAD files, and target distributors by way of 
“algorithmic enforcement,” where computer programs (“bots”) scour the 
Internet looking for content that bears the markings of an 
infringement.65 By using bots rather than human spotters, a broader 
range of infringing activities can be detected at far less cost than is 
required for manual enforcement. But economizing enforcement efforts 
has drawbacks. Invariably, such automated enforcement efforts are more 
prone to errors66 and inadvertent public relation mistakes.67 Moreover, 
mechanical enforcement operations (like the RIAA’s mass settlement 
campaign) are more likely to be perceived negatively, as is the case with 
formal litigation business models associated with trolling.68 
Overall, as rights holders ramp up enforcement, the negative 
perception is likely to increase, which could be detrimental to the 
interests of IP rights holders. If the public perceives enforcement to be 
 
 63. Following 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006), a prevailing plaintiff may recover statutory damages 
between $750 and $30,000 per copyrighted work. In the case of willful infringement by the defendant, 
damages of up to $150,000 per work may be recovered. Statutory damages were awarded in two peer-
to-peer cases. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding 
damages of $222,000 for the infringement of twenty-four songs by a single mother); Sony BMG Music 
Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 116–17 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 
487, 515 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding the constitutionality of statutory damages for copyright violations 
and remanding for reconsideration of the remittitur motion), on remand, 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1902 
(D. Mass. 2012) (reinstating initial jury award of statutory damages, imposing $22,500 per song shared 
by Boston University graduate student on peer-to-peer network). 
 64.  See generally Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: 
A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439 (2009) (discussing copyright damages 
reform). 
 65. See Geeta Dayal, The Algorithmic Copyright Cops: Streaming Videos Robotic Overlords, 
Wired (Sept. 6, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/streaming-videos-robotic-
overlords-algorithmic-copyright-cops/all (describing automated copyright systems that search for 
copyrighted material in real time). 
 66. See generally Ben Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 319 (2013) (describing sources and consequences of copyright enforcement mistakes ). 
 67. For instance, media outlets reported that the RIAA filed a claim against a twelve-year-old 
New York girl whose mother lived in a low-income area of New York City, and had accused an eighty- 
three-year-old woman who had died over a month earlier. See John Borland, RIAA Settles with 12-
Year-Old Girl, CNET News (Sept. 9, 2003, 4:05 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1027-5073717.html; 
Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, The Register (Feb. 5, 2005), http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_dead. 
 68. James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright 
Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 79, 79 (2012) (“To supplement 
profits from copyrighted works, copyright holders have devised a mass-litigation model to monetize, 
rather than deter, infringement . . . utiliz[ing] the threat of outlandish damage awards to force alleged 
infringers into quick settlements.”). 
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excessive, this might reinforce or strengthen a belief that the legal regime 
is not legitimate or that a legal rule is unjust.69 This is likely what 
happened in the wake of the highly publicized litigation campaign of the 
record industry. The public perceived that the industry was targeting 
college students in a settlement extortion campaign because the 
proposed $3000 settlement was always preferable to the individual’s 
financial exposure in litigation.70 Media reports that a single mother and 
a college student were each charged with six-figure damage awards for 
copyright infringements involving a handful of songs71 likely undermined 
the public support for the enforcement of copyright law and might have 
contributed to a public belief that the campaign against file sharing was 
excessive.72 
How much should such negative public attitudes be of concern to 
content rights holders? Can rights holders afford to ignore public 
backlash? What if increasing deterrence is the only way to discourage 
infringing behavior?73 
First, social science scholarship warns against purely coercive 
approaches to enforcement. For instance, experiments show that 
individuals tend to obey rules when they believe that it is the right thing 
to do.74 For that reason, it may matter a great deal whether the law or its 
 
 69.  See generally Francesco Parisi & Georg Von Wangenheim, Legislation and Countervailing 
Effects from Social Norms, in Evolution and Design of Institutions 25 (Christian Schubert & Georg 
Von Wangenheim eds., 2006), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/ 
working_papers/04-31.pdf (providing formal mathematical model of norm backlash effects). 
 70. Grant Gross, Congress Scrutinizes RIAA Tactics, IDG News (Sept. 17, 2003), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/112535/article.html; Katie Dean, Senator Wants Answers From 
RIAA, Wired (Aug. 1, 2003), http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/2003/08/59862; J. Cam 
Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling 
Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 
526 (2004); Daniel Reynolds, Note, The RIAA Litigation War on File Sharing and Alternatives More 
Compatible with Public Morality, 9 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 977, 978–87 (2008). See generally Pamela 
Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Debate, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory Damage Awards in 
Copyright Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 53 (2009) (discussing the constitutionality of copyright statutory 
damage awards).  
 71. See supra text accompanying note 63. 
 72. Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 51.  
 73. See generally George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Pol. Econ. 526 
(1970) (theory of rational law enforcement); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. 
1998) (explaining fundamental concepts of the economic approach to law). 
 74. For instance, in the context of tax compliance, extensive literature suggests that social 
motivations (ethical concerns, social norms, perceptions of fairness, etc.) can be stronger determinants 
of taxpaying behavior than material considerations. See Michael Wenzel, Motivation or 
Rationalization? Causal Relations Between Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance, 26 J. Econ. Psychol. 
491, 492 (2005); see also John S. Carroll, Compliance with the Law: A Decision-Making Approach to 
Taxpaying, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 319, 319–35 (1987) (applying decisionmaking models to tax law); 
Simon James, et al., Developing a Tax Compliance Strategy for Revenue Services, 55 Bull. for Int’l 
Fiscal Documentation 158–64 (2001). In fact, a number of empirical studies find that norms and 
beliefs are a stronger determinant of compliance than deterrence. For an overview, see Leandra 
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enforcement is perceived as being “just” or “fair.” Conversely, 
individuals might decide not to obey a legal command if the rule is 
considered “unjust.” In this process, normative intuitions about morality 
might cause individuals to set aside the risks associated with the illegal 
behavior. 
Second, when behavior is driven by normative viewpoints, 
unbalanced enforcement efforts might reinforce and strengthen the 
underlying opposition against the applicable laws.75 This effect is 
particularly strong when law enforcement conflicts with social norms or 
personal beliefs of what should be allowed. In the context of file sharing, 
the strongest opponents of enforcement were the most frequent file 
sharers. Frequent infringers, of course, had the most to lose from 
stringent enforcement, so their personal beliefs might simply reflect a 
self-serving bias. Moreover, research on cognitive dissonance suggests 
that individuals often adjust their attitudes and beliefs76 when they 
experience a conflict in their perceptions of reality.77 The next step in this 
process is to generalize these personal views to others. Indeed, 
individuals often believe that others are more like themselves than they 
actually are in reality. As a result, predictions about others’ beliefs or 
behaviors based on casual observation are very likely to err in the 
direction of one’s own personal beliefs.78 
Legal scholarship describes how vigorous legal condemnations of 
norms may end up strengthening the very antisocial norms that they are 
meant to combat.79 In the context of criminal law, for instance, William J. 
Stuntz has described situations in which prosecutions can work against 
the very norms on which they rest, causing “popular norms . . . to move 
 
Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 1453 
(2003). 
 75. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 
27 J. Legal Stud. 609 (1998); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683 (1999); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) 
Order in the Inner City, 32 Law & Soc’y Rev. 805 (1998). 
 76. Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We 
Can Make Them Sane, 16 Va. Tax Rev. 155, 200 (1996) (describing how people amend their cognitive 
frame to reduce conflict by incorporating new perceptions of reality). 
 77. See, e.g., Leo Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957); Jon Elster, Sour 
Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (1983). The classic example of this is expressed in 
the fable where a fox sees some high-hanging grapes and wishes to eat them. When the fox is unable to 
reach the grapes, he surmises that the grapes are probably not worth eating, as they must not be ripe 
or that they are probably sour. Aesop, The Fox and the Grapes (ca. 620–564 BCE). 
 78. The false consensus effect is described in, for example, Brian Mullen, et al., The False 
Consensus Effect: A Meta-Analysis of 115 Hypothesis Tests, 21 J. of Experimental Soc. Psychol. 262 
(1985); Lee Ross, et al., The “False Consensus Effect”: An Egocentric Bias In Social Perception And 
Attribution Processes, 13 J. of Experimental Soc. Psychol. 279 (1977). 
 79. For a theoretical model, see Parisi & Wangenheim, supra note 69 (describing a cycle of 
opinion formation in which public acts of disobedience and protest undermine the legitimacy of 
legislation, which leads to further opposition). 
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in the opposite direction from the law.”80 Specifically, enforcement may 
reinforce or strengthen a belief that the legal regime is not legitimate or 
that a legal rule is unjust. This is especially true if the public perceives the 
legal sanction to be excessive in relation to the punished behavior. 
Several studies document that enforcement measures can backfire and 
cause an overall increase in illicit behavior.81 These dynamics help 
explain the public backlash in response to the music industry’s litigation 
campaign. By increasing enforcement without regard to the public’s 
perception, the record industry might have increased, rather than 
decreased, the rate and frequency of infringing activities, particularly 
among college students.82 
3D printing will likely exhibit similar dynamics. Users of 3D printing 
obviously benefit from the use of their printer and might adopt a liberal 
viewpoint on what can be printed out at home without much regard for 
IP rights. Much like users of peer-to-peer networks, owners of 3D 
printers might externalize these personal beliefs and come to consider 
their own beliefs as social norms. Such liberal, non-commercial 3D 
printing norms might be particularly strong since, like file sharing before 
it, users might (1) download and print materials that they would not have 
bought anyway; (2) believe that their unauthorized print-outs might 
inspire others—say a visitor to their home—to buy the actual product in 
stores; (3) have altered the design of the items to their own preferences, 
creating an attribution effect that causes them to feel entitled to print the 
altered version without a license. Given these circumstances, it is 
reasonable to assume that pro-3D printing norms will be quite robust 
and that enforcement measures might induce a counterproductive 
backlash effect. 
Punitive deterrence measures may well undermine the interests of 
IP rights holders in the forthcoming confrontation with counterfeit 3D 
printing. First, enforcement measures that are perceived as excessive 
might cause potential infringers to disregard the law on inconsequential 
grounds. If the deterrent or coercive aspects of enforcement create a 
belief that the underlying legal rules are unjust, individuals might decide 
to disobey the law—despite the added costs associated with breaking the 
law. Second, evading unjust or immoral enforcement measures might be 
 
 80. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1872 (2000) (suggesting that 
misguided enforcement priorities can inadvertently shift public support away the underlying laws). 
 81. See, e.g., John S. Carroll, A Psychological Approach to Deterrence: The Evaluation of Crime 
Opportunities, 36 J. of Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1512 (1978); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald 
Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 
J. of Crim. Law & Criminology 325 (1980); Kent W. Smith, Integrating Three Perspectives on 
Noncompliance: A Sequential Decision Model, 17 Crim. Just. & Behav. 350 (1990). 
 82. See Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, supra note 51 (providing experimental evidence of 
normative backlash effect in the context of file sharing and copyright enforcement). 
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gratifying to some individuals, perhaps sufficiently so that it may 
outweigh the risks involved with engaging in infringing behavior. Finally, 
in the long run, normatively excessive deterrence may undermine the 
political support for the underlying protected rights. As public attitudes 
change, political actors are more likely to consider revoking or 
moderating the legal framework and available remedies. When 
confronting 3D printing infringements, manufacturers would be wise to 
heed these lessons from the record industry’s experience with file 
sharing. 
Conclusion: Alternatives 
The enforcement of IP rights on 3D printing presents a vexing 
dilemma for holders of patents, trademarks, and copyrights: when 
noncompliance and infringement are widespread, effective deterrence 
cannot be attained without raising enforcement to levels that threaten to 
undermine support for IP rights. 
If property rights are costly to enforce (litigation expenses, social 
friction) and enforcement is not very effective, the legitimacy of the legal 
rights are undermined. In the classic treatment of the emergence of 
property rights, Harold Demsetz sets out the conditions that foster the 
creation of property rights.83 Several scholars have since elaborated on 
the effects of enforcement costs on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
private property rights.84 As the classic story of the enclosure movement 
illustrates, reductions in private enforcement costs (such as the invention 
of barbed wire, for instance) are traditionally associated with an 
expansion of private property rights. In this framework, recent 
technological changes might suggest a move away from private property 
rights to a society favoring the idea of common property.85 It is worth 
considering whether 3D printing is one such technology. Like peer-to-
peer file sharing and copyright enforcement before it, 3D printing 
technologies will make it increasingly difficult to enforce IP rights on 
physical items. Because infringers are decentralized, enforcement is 
ineffective and costly. Moreover, efforts to bolster enforcement through 
 
 83. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967). 
Demsetz attributes the relative absence of private property rights on the Southwestern plains to the 
high costs of containing wide range, migratory animals. For Native Americans of the Labrador 
Peninsula, fencing forest animals was relatively less expensive. Variance in the degree of private 
property rights protection can be explained in relation to the costs involved in the “fencing” of those 
assets. 
 84. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1315–44 (1993); Barry C. 
Field, The Evolution of Property Rights, 42 Kyklos 319, (1989); Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The 
Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J. Law & Econ. 163, 164–68 (1975). 
 85. Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. 421, 
429–33 (2002) (describing how technologies may affect a shift from commons to private property rights 
and back to common property). 
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technological protections are likely to set off an arms race between 
manufacturers and hackers, involving costly, non-productive uses of 
resources. These difficulties are illustrated in the long-standing litigation 
involving peer-to-peer technologies and copyright law.86 
These insights increase the appeal of alternative measures that 
might protect the incentives and investments of product designers and 
manufactures in a world of 3D printing. All options have their 
downsides, of course. Regulating the manufacturing and technical design 
of 3D printers to prevent infringing uses may interfere with innovation 
and inadvertently tax legitimate uses of 3D printers.87 Imposing IP levies 
on raw materials or 3D printers indiscriminately affects all users of 3D 
printers, making even legitimate uses of 3D printers more costly. 
The costs of enforcing IP rights must be considered fully when 
regulating and setting the boundaries of rights on new technologies. 3D 
technology is no different. It is important to note that in certain 
industries, 3D printing not only reduces the costs of IP infringements, but 
also the costs of designing and producing new items of manufacture. 
Given that IP rights are created to provide incentives and enable 
property right holders to recoup their investments, when those 
investment costs decrease, so does the need for IP rights. 
When 3D printing reduces the costs of production as well as 
distribution of products, the enforcement of IP rights on 3D printing is 
likely to create social costs without generating offsetting benefits. This 
reason alone justifies taking a hard look at IP doctrine with an eye 
towards adapting it to the social and economic changes affected by the 
revolution of 3D printing. 
 
 86. See Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty, supra note 32. 
 87. See Desai & Magliocca, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2).  
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